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Finality of Conviction, the Right to
Appeal, and Deportation Under
Montenegro v. Ashcroft: The Case of
the Dog That Did Not Bark
By ASHWIN GOKHALE*
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited
as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness,-a country where he may
have formed the most tender connections; where he may have vested his en-
tire proerty ... and where he may have nearly completed his probationary
title to citizenship... if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and
among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the name can be applied.
-James Madison 1
AHMED D. IS A COLLEGE STUDENT who has grown up and lived
in California for the past twenty years after immigrating to the United
States from a Middle Eastern country with his parents as a small
child. 2 Ahmed married a girl with whom he had a tumultuous rela-
tionship and whose family disapproved of him. The ill-advised mar-
riage gradually disintegrated into divorce, with name-calling and
threats from both sides. Her family obtained a restraining order
against Ahmed, which both he and she regularly violated by continu-
ing to contact each other. Finally, in an exercise of youthful bad judg-
ment, Ahmed ended up in a physical altercation with her father and
* Class of 2006; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2000. The author would like
to thank his parents for their unflagging support through the peaks and valleys of his
academic career. He would also like to thank his editor, Michelle Tschumper, for her
patience and tireless work on this piece.
1. James Madison, Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4 DE-
BATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B.
Lippincott, 2d ed.,J.B. Lippincott 1907).
2. Ahmed is a pseudonym. The facts presented here are from a real case, but be-
cause of privacy issues his real name will not be used. Documentation is on file with author.
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brother-in-law, resulting in Ahmed's arrest and subsequent assault
conviction. His lawyer filed an appeal on his behalf, as is guaranteed
to him under California law.3 The appeal is based in part on the asser-
tion that the prosecutor made statements during the trial designed to
exploit racial prejudice, with knowledge that two jurors had previously
admitted that they harbored prejudice towards Middle Eastern men.
Despite the pendency of his appeal, Ahmed was detained by fed-
eral agents immediately after the trial verdict and put in removal pro-
ceedings4 by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). This
was done as part of an aggressive deportation policy that offers virtu-
ally no quarter to any deportable person, regardless of the individual
circumstances or danger posed.5 Immigration legislation passed in
1996 mandates detention without bond during removal proceedings6
despite the fact that Ahmed was not sentenced to any jail term at his
trial. Even though his appeal is still pending, and before that appeal is
ever heard, he may be uprooted from his home and family and depos-
ited in a foreign country with which he has no real connection-a stiff
penalty for getting into a fight. If deported, Ahmed will have little to
no chance of ever returning to his life as he knows it, even if his con-
viction is eventually overturned, and he is cleared of any criminal
wrongdoing.
To the relief of Ahmed, this outcome is not possible in California
due to a longstanding rule that bars deportation based on a criminal
conviction until the right to direct appeal has been exhausted or
waived ("finality rule");7 the use of this rule as a defense to deporta-
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1237, 1466(2) (West 2004). The right of appeal is virtually
universal and is included in many state constitutions. See infra Part III.A.1.
4. Deportation proceedings were replaced with "removal" proceedings in the 1996
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Removal proceedings en-
compass what was previously separated into "deportation" and "exclusion" proceedings. 5
CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01 (2005). This Note uses
the terms interchangeably.
5. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Lim-
ited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HAIRV. L. REV. 1936, 1938, 1948 (2000).
6. This provision has sparked a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Amy Langenfeld,
Comment, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1041, 1043-44 (1999).
7. See, e.g., White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475 (1st Cir. 1994); Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904
F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990); Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1981); Marino v.
INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F. 2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975);
Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971). Despite the finality rule, criminal appellants have
been deported. See People v. Garcia, 89 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Cuellar v.
State, 13 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Tex. App. 2000); People v. Shaw, 654 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997); State v. Castano, No. 88-02822, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 7259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Nov. 7, 1989); State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Wash. 1989). In many cases, this is likely
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tion resulted in the termination of removal proceedings in this case.
However, the possibility of deportation, an unfair and illogical result,
is now the reality within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit after
Montenegro v. Ashcroft.8 The Montenegro court appears to have found
that the statutory definition of "conviction" for immigration purposes
included in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act 9 ("IIRIRA") displaces the judicially-created finality
rule. 10 This decision was reluctantly followed as binding precedent for
this proposition by a lower court in Galarza-Solis v. Ashcroft" to deport
a legal permanent resident who had lawfully made his home in the
United States for over two decades. 12 The defendant in Galarza-Solis
was deported despite the pendency of a direct appeal from his under-
lying criminal conviction, an appeal guaranteed to him by the Illinois
Constitution.' 3 Meanwhile, in an opinion issued just months after
Montenegro, the Sixth Circuit applied the finality rule without consider-
ing that it may no longer be valid.14
This Note argues that the Montenegro decision should not be con-
sidered binding precedent for a finding of congressional abolishment
of the finality rule. Such a reading of the case is unsupported and
even contradicted by the authority the court cites and has drastic ef-
fects upon noncitizens that Congress and the Montenegro court could
not have intended. The innocuous language of the decision and its
radical apparent consequences, along with the complete lack of evi-
dence of congressional intent to abolish the finality rule, is analogous
to Sherlock Holmes's clue of the "dog that did not bark," necessitating
a closer examination of whether such a reading is reasonable and jus-
tified.15 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Great Detective understood that a
due to the fact that noncitizens are not entitled to a state-appointed attorney in removal
proceedings, and many are thus not well-equipped to rely on the finality rule to challenge
their deportation. See, e.g., Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001);
Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2001). The Montenegro decision prevents even
immigrants fortunate enough to have representation from availing themselves of the final-
ity rule.
8. 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2004).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A) (2000).
10. 355 F.3d at 1037.
11. No. 03-C-9188, 2004 WL 728199 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2004).
12. Id. at 4 n.4 ("Solis' [sic] contends that Montenegro was wrongly decided because it
results in deportation before the alien has a chance to fully appeal the criminal conviction
resulting in the deportation. While this Court feels that this result is certainly unfair, the
Seventh Circuit dictates our decision in this case.").
13. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 6.
14. United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2004).
15. See infra Part III.B.
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watchdog's failure to bark in the night was an important clue, and so
too should courts take into account the absence of any congressional
intent or debate concerning the finality rule before concluding that it
has been abolished.
Part I of this Note lays out background on the grounds for re-
moval of noncitizens, traces the history of the definition of "convic-
tion" and the accompanying finality rule, and describes how passage
of IIRIRA changed this definition. An examination of legislative intent
indicates that Congress sought to include deferred adjudications in
the definition of "conviction" as that definition had been set by the
Board of Immigration Appeals, and not that it intended to abolish the
finality rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. Part II analyzes the
reasoning of Montenegro, arguing that reading the decision to find con-
gressional elimination of the finality rule is inappropriate. The sur-
vival of the finality rule was a moot issue in the case, and thus it is
likely that the court never intended to make the expansive holding
created by its unspecific language. Part III argues that IIRIRA should
not be read to eliminate the finality rule due to principles of federal-
ism, constitutional due process and equal protection concerns, the
complete lack of congressional intent to eliminate the rule, and ca-
nons of statutory construction. The right to appeal from a trial convic-
tion is ingrained in our criminal justice system as being crucial to
determining guilt and innocence and should not be denied to any-
one. Overall, this Note seeks to outline the relevant arguments for
bringing a future challenge to Montenegro or any interpretation of it
similar to that in Galarza-Solis.16
I. Background
Congress derives its plenary constitutional authority17 to regulate
immigration from the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").18
The INA defines several classes of deportable noncitizens, including
those convicted of aggravated felonies, crimes of moral turpitude,
controlled substance violations, and crimes of violence. 19 The statutes
defining these deportable crimes seek to incorporate by reference
16. All of the arguments for survival of the finality rule outlined in this Note apply
equally to Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999), dicta of which arrives at the same
holding as, and is relied upon by, Montenegro. Moosa is discussed in detail infra Part II.B.1.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
18. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537
(2000)); ROBERT C. DIWNE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE § 5-2 (2002)).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000).
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hundreds of state and federal criminal offenses.20 Noncitizens con-
victed of removable crimes may be detained by United States Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") 21 and put in removal
proceedings before an immigration judge.22 The immigration judge's
decisions can be appealed before the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") or, in some circumstances, before the federal court of appeals
that has jurisdiction over the circuit in which the immigration pro-
ceedings took place.23 When construing an immigration statute, fed-
eral courts will accord deference to the BIA's interpretation as long as
it is a reasonable construction. 24
Before passage of IIRIRA, the definition of what constituted a
"conviction" for immigration purposes was an ever-evolving judicial
construct.25 Federal courts have continually refined the definition of
"conviction" over the years to take into account the increasing preva-
lence of state rehabilitative statutes, such as suspended sentences, 26
deferred adjudications, 27 and expungements.2 8 In its 1955 decision in
20. Brian Bates, Good Ideas Gone Bad: Plea Bargains and Resident Aliens, 66 TEX. BAR J.
878 (2003).
21. Prior to the September 11 attacks, immigration services and enforcement were
handled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). After the attacks, the INS
was abolished and its responsibilities were transferred to the new Department of Home-
land Security, which splits immigration and naturalization services and immigration en-
forcement between United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and ICE,
respectively. See 6 U.S.C.A. § 291 (West 2005); id. § 251; 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2004).
22. 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.02, 104.13
(2005).
23. 1 Id. § 104.13(3)(c).
24. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 4, § 104.07 n.18.
25. See In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 548-49 (B.I.A. 1988); see also Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
26. A suspended sentence is one in which imposition of the sentence is postponed
indefinitely, unless further crimes are committed. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1032 (8th ed.
2004).
27. In deferred adjudications a judge determines that a defendant who has pled guilty
should be placed on probation without continuing the proceedings to arrive at a formal
adjudication of guilt. LaRonn Hogg Haught, Comment, Deferred Entry ofJudgment: An Over-
looked and Undervalued Benefit of Proposition 21, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 339, 347-50 (2004)
(describing deferred adjudications in the context ofjuveniles). Many states have provisions
allowing for deferred adjudication and probation, with expungement of criminal records
upon successful completion of probation. Deferred adjudications are typically given in lim-
ited types of cases, such as those involving first-time offenders, juveniles, or minor crimes.
Deferred adjudications also serve interests ofjudicial economy since they are given in ex-
change for a guilty plea. See Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise
of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1724 n.75 (2003)
(citing state deferred adjudication statutes); see also Haught, supra, at 351 (praising de-
ferred adjudications in the context of juveniles).
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Pino v. Landon,29 the Supreme Court first articulated that the finality
rule is an additional consideration in determining the sufficiency of a
"conviction" for deportation purposes.30 Unlike the definitional ele-
ments of "conviction," the finality rule was a constant until
Montenegro.31
A. The Pre-IIRURA Finality Rule and Definition of "Conviction"
for Immigration Purposes
In Pino, the Court considered whether a noncitizen could be de-
ported based on a conviction that had been placed "on file" by the
state court, meaning that no sentence would be imposed despite a
finding of guilt.32 The defendant challenged the use of an "on file"
conviction as a basis for deportation, but the appellate court did not
accept this argument and upheld the deportation order.33 The Su-
preme Court reversed, expressing the concept of the finality rule in a
short per curiam opinion, which reads in its entirety "[o]n the record
here we are unable to say that the conviction has attained such finality
as to support an order of deportation within the contemplation of
§ 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The judgment is re-
versed."3 4 Since Pino, every circuit presented with the issue interpreted
the concept of "finality" to include that all direct appellate review of
the conviction was either exhausted or waived.35 When conviction re-
versal rates and the universal nature of the right to criminal appeal
are considered,3 6 the importance of the finality rule is revealed: it en-
sures that the harsh sanction of deportation is reserved for those
whose guilt is verified and subject to judicial review.
28. See Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 548-50. An expungement is the erasure of a convic-
tion from a criminal record. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 621 (8th ed. 2004).
29. 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
30. Id.
31. Moosa v. INS also contains language that indicates IIRIRA eliminated the finality
rule, although it has not been followed thus far for this proposition by any court except for
Montenegro. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F. 3d
1035, 1037 (2004). Moosa is discussed in detail infra Part II.B.1.
32. Pino, 349 U.S. at 901 (rev'gPino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1954)).
33. Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 244-45 (1st Cir. 1954).
34. Pino, 349 U.S. at 901.
35. See, e.g., White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475 (1st Cir. 1994); Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904
F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990); Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1981); Marino v.
INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F. 2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975);
Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971).
36. See infra Part III.A.
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In 1959, the BIA in Matter of L-R-37 defined a "conviction" as ex-
isting for immigration purposes where (1) there has been a judicial
finding of guilt, (2) there is some sentence imposed, and (3) the ac-
tion of the court is considered a conviction by the State for some pur-
pose.3 8 This definition of "conviction" was in effect until the 1988 BIA
decision in Matter of Ozkok.39 The BIA in Ozkok set forth the framework
for determining a "conviction" for purposes of the INA that was used
until 1996 passage of IIRIRA. The BIA in Ozkok departed from the
Matter of L-R- definition in order to account for the increasing use of
state rehabilitative measures and changes in criminal procedure that
had taken place over the previous thirty years.40 The appellant in
Ozkok pled guilty to a drug offense in exchange for a stay of judgment
and three years probation. 41 When he was subsequently placed in re-
moval proceedings, he argued that the stay of judgment negated a
conviction for immigration purposes.42 The Ozkok court modified the
definition of conviction that was then in force to take into account
situations in which there is deferred adjudication of guilt to arrive at
the following rule:
As in the past, we shall consider a person convicted if the
court has adjudicated him guilty or has entered a formal judgment
of guilt. Since such a judicial action is generally deemed a final
conviction in both federal and state jurisdictions, it will be suffi-
cient to constitute a conviction for immigration purposes without
consideration of the other two factors of our former test.
Where adjudication of guilt has been withheld, however, fur-
ther examination of the specific procedure used and the state au-
thority under which the court acted will be necessary. As a general
rule, a conviction will be found for immigration purposes where all
of the following elements are present:
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has en-
tered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient
facts to warrant a finding of guilty;
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty,
or restraint on the person's liberty to be imposed (including but
not limited to incarceration, probation, a fine or restitution, or
community-based sanctions such as a rehabilitation program, a
work-release or study-release program, revocation or suspension of
a driver's license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privi-
leges, or community service); and
37. 8 I. & N. Dec. 269 (B.I.A. 1959).
38. Id. at 270.
39. 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988).
40. Id. at 550.
41. Id. at 547.
42. See id. at 548.
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(3) a judgment of adjudication of guilt may be entered if the
person violates the terms of his probation or fails to comply with
the requirements of the court's order, without availability of fur-
ther proceedings regarding the person's guilt or innocence of the
original charge. 43
This definition creates a two-part test for determining whether
someone is "convicted" for immigration purposes. The first part cov-
ers a normal trial court conviction, and the second part consists of a
three-prong test to determine what types of deferred adjudications
will be considered "convictions" for immigration purposes. The first
and second prong cover a finding of criminal behavior and the impo-
sition of some sort of penalty. The third prong distinguishes between
rehabilitative statutes that defer adjudication and statutes that ex-
punge a prior adjudication, allowing for removal in the latter case but
not the former.44
A footnote to this definition notes the separate consideration of
the Pino finality rule, as had always been in place under the Matter of L-
R- framework,4 5 adding that "[i] t is well established that a conviction
does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes
until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or
waived."4 6 Under this overall framework, the court held that Ozkok's
conviction was "sufficiently final to support an order of deportation,"
since the state statutory basis for his deferred adjudication allowed for
judgment to be entered without any further review of the question of
guilt.4
7
B. IIRIRA and the Definition of "Conviction" for Immigration
Purposes
The 1996 passage of the IIRIRA (and its contemporary Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 48 ("AEDPA")) marked a major
upheaval in the already Byzantine INA,49 imposing sweeping changes
43. Id. at 551-52 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
44. See Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 226 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003).
45. Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990). While this
case's reliance on Ozkok for its exclusion of deferred adjudication from the definition of
conviction has been superseded by IIRIRA, its discussion of the history of the definition of
conviction and the finality rule remains valid. See id. (finality rule); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (48) (A) (2000) (superseding statute).
46. Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 552 n.7.
47. It. at 553.
48. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
49. See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (comparing the INA to the mythical
labyrinth of the Minotaur in ancient Crete); see, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Sever-
ity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 612 (2003)
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and provoking strong emotions and concerns from noncitizens and
their advocates. 50 Among other changes, IIRIRA eliminates judicial
discretion as to individual circumstances, mandates detention during
removal proceedings, and also greatly expands the universe of deport-
able crimes; this includes an expanded definition of "aggravated fel-
ony" that makes jumping a subway turnstile in New York City a crime
punishable by exile. 51 Many refer to this watershed as the "criminaliza-
tion" of immigration law. 52
As is consistent with this overall purpose, IRIRA enlarges the
scope of what is considered a "conviction" for immigration purposes,
although it does so in a narrower manner than is suggested by
Montenegro.
The IIRIRA definition codifies the two-part Ozkok rule with the
exception of the third prong of the second part, which served to ex-
clude deferred adjudications from the definition of "conviction":
The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where
(1) ajudge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has en-
tered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient
facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.5 3
(noting that immigration practitioners are "reeling" from reform legislation that has "cre-
ated a sense of crisis that pervades the practice of immigration law").
50. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HIAv. L. REV. 1936, 1937-38 (2000) (finding
IIRIRA provisions to be "misguided" and citing several criticisms of IIRIRA as providing for
retroactive punishment for noncitizens); Peter H. Shuck & John Williams, Removing Crimi-
nal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 367, 371 (1999)
("IIRIRA may be the harshest, most procrustean immigration control measure in this cen-
tury."); Symposium, Immigration Law and Human Rights: Legal Line Drawing Post-September 11,
25 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 1 (2005); Melissa Cook, Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The
Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation,
23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003) (arguing that the expansive definition of "aggravated
felony" in the INA constitutes a violation of international treaties and law due to its inclu-
sion of minor crimes); Ella Dlin, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996: An Attempt to Quench Anti-Immigration Sentiments?, 38 CATH. LAw. 49, 61-66, (1998);
Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executioner: INS Summary-Exclusion Power Under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 82 MINN. L. REv. 209, 210 (1997)
("Draconian" IIRIRA provisions constitute "national scapegoating" of noncitizens).
51. Morawetz, supra note 50, at 1941.
52. Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penol-
ogy, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 613 (2003).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000).
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The House Conference Report ("Report") associated with IIRIRA
states that the purpose of creating a statutory definition is to
"broaden [ ] the scope" of what constitutes a "conviction" by eliminat-
ing the part of the Ozkok rule that did not allow for removal in certain
types of deferred adjudications. 54 The Report notes that the elimi-
nated prong allowed noncitizens who clearly engaged in criminal be-
havior (due to the first two prongs of a finding or plea of guilt along
with some form of punishment or restraint on liberty) to escape de-
portation.55 After this description of the Ozkok rule and criticism of its
treatment of deferred adjudications, the Report goes on to state the
two purposes of adding a statutory definition of "conviction" to the
INA. The first purpose is to adopt the Ozkok definition sans the third
prong of the second part, thus clarifying congressional intent that a
deferred adjudication should always be considered a "conviction" for
deportation purposes. The second purpose of adding a definition is
that any court-ordered sentence be considered "actually imposed" re-
gardless of whether it is carried out when determining immigration
consequences that depend on the length of a sentence. 56 The Report
does not make any reference to the Pino finality rule or to availability
or pendency of direct appeal; it is chiefly concerned with including
deferred adjudications within the definition of "conviction."5 7
In Montenegro, the defendant was convicted by a jury for posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute. 58 Montenegro is the first deci-
sion to suggest that the finality rule is eliminated in the context of a
case arising under the first part of the IIRIRA definition dealing with a
trial conviction and is not just a non-factor in deferred adjudication
cases under the second part.59
H. Montenegro Should Not Be Accorded the Status of Binding
Precedent in Regards to the Finality Rule
Marcelino Montenegro, a legal permanent resident of the United
States, was convicted by a jury in 1996 of cocaine possession with in-
tent to distribute and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. 60 He
was subsequently placed in removal proceedings on the basis of that




58. Montenegro v. INS, 245 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
59. Moosa v. INS also draws this conclusion, although its facts deal with a deferred
adjudication. See infra Part II.B.1.
60. Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1036 (7th Cir. 2004).
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conviction and was stripped of his permanent resident status and or-
dered removed by an immigration judge in 1998.61 His appeal of the
removal order came before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
2004 on appeal from a district court's denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.62
On appeal, Montenegro made four arguments: (1) that he was
eligible for discretionary withholding of deportation despite the abol-
ishment of such relief by IIRIRA and AEDPA, (2) that application of
JIRIRA and AEDPA to his pre-1996 conviction violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause, (3) that abolition of discretionary relief constituted an
equal protection violation, and (4) that his conviction was not final. 63
The court dispensed with his first argument by finding that his case
did not fit into either of the two exceptions to the IIRIRA provisions
abolishing the availability of discretionary relief.64 His second argu-
ment was thrown out since the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to
removal proceedings, and the court declined to address his equal pro-
tection argument since he did not develop it in a meaningful way.
65
The court then turned to Montenegro's finality of conviction ar-
gument, making note of the pre-IIRIRA Pino rule barring removal
where there is a pending appeal. The court then stated "IIRIRA, how-
ever, treats an alien as 'convicted' once a court enters a formal judg-
ment of guilt. IIRIRA eliminated the finality requirement for a
conviction, set forth in Pino, even for noncitizens who were found
guilty before April 1, 1997."66 The court devoted just four sentences to
the issue of finality, citing Moosa v. INS67 and Griffiths v. INS68 as au-
thority for the proposition that IIRIRA eliminated the finality rule
without supplying any new analysis. 69 The court's language concern-
ing the finality rule was both unnecessary and unsupported by the pre-
cedent it cited, needlessly increasing the risk that someone who is not
actually guilty of a crime will be banished from the United States.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1036-37.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1037.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999).
68. 243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
69. Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037-38.
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A. The Issue of Finality of Conviction Was Not Before the
Montenegro Court
The question of whether IIRIRA eliminates the finality rule did
not need to be decided by the Montenegro court because the types of
appeals that Montenegro had pending were never a bar to his removal
under the finality rule. The finality rule bars removal until the right of
direct appeal has been exhausted or waived, not where there is a
pending discretionary or collateral appeal or a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.70 At the time of the removal order, the only appeals
Montenegro had pending were a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court and a post-conviction appeal.7 1 He had already exhausted his
avenues for direct appeal, as his conviction was affirmed by an appel-
late court, and the Illinois Supreme Court had declined to consider
further appeal.72 The government's brief filed in opposition to Monte-
negro's appeal of his removal order argued that Montenegro would
be considered convicted for immigration purposes regardless of
whether the finality rule survived enactment of IIRIRA. 73 According to
the Seventh Circuit's own precedent, the fact that survival of the final-
ity rule was not relevant to the disposition of the case made the discus-
sion of the finality rule dicta, weakening its value as precedent. 74
Indeed, the per curiam nature and conclusory language of the deci-
sion, in addition to the court's eschewment of oral argument as un-
necessary, strongly suggests that the court viewed its ruling as one
applying existing law, as opposed to promulgating an expanded rule
finding that finality is no longer a factor for cases arising under the
70. See Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1981); In rePolanco, 20 1.
& N. Dec. 894, 896 (B.I.A. 1994).
71. Montenegro v. INS, 245 F. Supp. 2d, 936, 940-41 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
72. Id. at 937.
73. Brief of Respondents-Appellees at 18-21, Montenegro v. INS, 245 F. Supp. 2d 936
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 03-1850).
74. The Seventh Circuit has outlined its principles for distinguishing dicta from bind-
ing holdings. The court outlines an approach that looks for reasons against giving weight
to a passage found in a previous opinion, with the factors including (1) that the "passage
was unnecessary to the outcome," and therefore "not as fully considered"; (2) that it can be
eliminated "without damaging the analytical structure of the opinion"; (3) that the passage
"was not grounded in the facts of the case"; and (4) that it was not presented as an issue,
and therefore not "refined by the fires of adversary presentation." United States v. Crawley,
837 F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988). Consideration of the first three factors strongly
weigh towards viewing the finality rule discussion in Montenegro as dictum; as for the fourth,
while the issue was raised by the petitioner, its treatment in the government's brief as being
in any case irrelevant can hardly be considered as sharpening the issue for the court. Brief
of Respondents-Appellees at 18-21, Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-1850).
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first part of the IIRIRA definition of "conviction" covering a trial con-
viction.75 The remainder of this section shows that the precedent
cited by Montenegro resists a reading finding such an expanded rule.
B. Montenegro's Finality Rule Holding Is Based on Inadequate and
Inapposite Precedent
Montenegro relied entirely on Moosa v. INS76 and Griffiths v. 1NS77
to support its statement that IIRIRA eliminated the finality rule and
did not contain any new analysis on the issue. 78 The following analysis
will thus focus on what support, or lack thereof, these two cases offer
for finality rule annulment. Both cases dealt with deferred adjudica-
tions falling under the second part of the IIRIRA definition of "convic-
tion," as opposed to the formal judgment of guilt at issue in
Montenegro. Like Montenegro, the court in Moosa discussed the finality
rule despite the fact that it was a moot issue in the case. To the extent
that Moosa concluded that the finality rule has been abolished, it was
wrongly decided. Griffiths provided even less support for the Galarza-
Solis reading of Montenegro, as it explicitly stopped short of the pro-
position that the finality rule no longer applied in any context while
strongly suggesting that it should apply to cases falling under the first
part of the definition covering a formal adjudication of guilt. Ulti-
mately, the precedent relied upon by Montenegro did not support the
broad language of its holding.
1. Moosa Should Not Be Relied upon for Abolishment of the
Finality Rule
In Moosa, the defendant was appealing a deportation order based
on a deferred adjudication. 79 This should have meant a relatively sim-
ple analysis given the clear intent of Congress to include deferred ad-
judications in the definition of "conviction"; indeed, the Moosa court
pointed to the Report's clear intent in this regard.80 The Moosa court
went on to note that the issue of finality was moot because the defen-
dant did not actually have any right to appeal from his deferred adju-
75. See Walker v. Doe, 558 S.E.2d 290, 295 (W. Va. 2001) ("[A] per curiam opinion
involves application of settled law to facts .... ."). Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Court of
Appeal, 434 So. 2d 310, 312-13 (Fla. 1983) ("[S]uch a decision is not a precedent for a
principle of law and should not be relied upon for anything other than res judicata.").
76. 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999).
77. 243 F.3d 45 (lst Cir. 2001).
78. Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004).
79. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 997.
80. Id. at 1002.
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dication.8 1 Despite this, the court engaged in lengthy dicta on the
finality rule, putting forth three justifications for finding that passage
of the IIRIRA definition of "conviction" overruled Pin that (1)
IIRIRA modification of Ozkok means abrogation of the Pino finality
rule; (2) Congress intended to track the INS Legalization Appeals
Unit's rule in Matter ofM.82 ; and (3) the BIA found elimination of the
finality rule in Matter of Punu83 ,84 Examination of these justifications
finds all of them wanting, seriously undercutting the persuasiveness of
Moosa to the extent it discusses the finality rule.
a. Moosa Incorrectly Characterized the Finality Rule's Relationship
with the Definition of "Conviction"
Moosa based its dicta on abolishment of the finality rule in part
upon the fact that Pino was a judicial construction of the then unde-
fined term "conviction" and that Congress has now provided a defini-
tion that does not include the finality rule.85 This argument holds
initial appeal, but it assumes that Congress legislated in a vacuum
when it enacted § 1101 (a) (48) (A). It is clear that Congress intended
to adopt the Ozkok framework with one modification: the elimination
of the portion of the definition of "conviction" that exempted de-
ferred adjudications. 86 When Congress exhibits detailed knowledge of
ajudicial construction that it adopts with selected changes, other judi-
cial interpretations that Congress does not explicitly remove are pre-
sumed to be left intact.8 7
This argument also rests on the erroneous assumption that the
finality rule was part of the Ozkok definition of "conviction."8 8 In fact,
Ozkok noted the finality rule as a separate, overarching consideration
outside of the Ozkok prongs, as the Moosa court stated before contra-
dicting itself several pages later; the court first referred to the finality
rule as being "superimposed" on the definition of "conviction," but
81. Id. at 1009 n.8. The Seventh Circuit has stated that this constitutes reason for
treating all of Moosa's discussion on the finality rule as dicta. See United States v. Crawley,
837 F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988). As of this Note, Montenegro remains the only case to
cite Moosa for finding that IIRIRA abrogates the finality rule.
82. 19 I. & N. Dec. 861 (B.I.A. 1989).
83. 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (B.I.A. 1998).
84. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1002.
85. Id. at 1008-09; see also In re Punu, 22 1. & N. Dec. 224, 230 (Grant, J., concurring).
86. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 223-24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
87. Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 246-47 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting).
88. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1009. "Congress deliberately eliminated the third prong of the
Ozkok test (which appears to incorporate a finality concept)." Id.
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then stated that it is incorporated into the third Ozkok prong.89 The
concept of "finality" that is implicated in the third Ozkok prong relates
to distinguishing between different types of rehabilitative statutes, 90
an entirely different consideration from the issue of direct appeal
from a trial conviction encompassed by the finality rule.
The history of the finality rule and definition of "conviction" pro-
vides further evidence that they are separate.91 The finality rule was
promulgated by the Supreme Court in Pino, while the definition of
"conviction" had been in the hands of the BIA, first in Matter of L-R-9 2
and later in Ozkok.9 3 Matter of L-R- does not mention the finality rule,
while Ozkok made note of the "longstanding" rule in a footnote to its
definition of "conviction." Fundamentally, this means that Ozkok and
Pino expressed two related concepts that do not overlap or infringe
upon each other.94 To reason that the Pino finality rule was merely the
first step in the promulgation of the definition of "conviction" as op-
posed to a separate, if related, consideration would mean that the BIA
in Matter of L-R- somehow eliminated the finality rule that the Su-
preme Court promulgated and that Ozkok brought it back nearly thirty
years later. This was not the case, however, as the finality rule was in
consistent use throughout the time periods when each of these BIA
definitions of "conviction" were in effect. 95 Ozkok is more clearly read
as simply annotating a new definition of "conviction" with the related
finality rule for the benefit of practitioners; the so-called omission 9 6 of
the finality rule from § 1101(a) (48) (A) does not warrant a finding
that it has been abolished.
89. Compare id. at 1000 (the finality requirement is "superimposed" on the definition
of "conviction"), with id. at 1009 (the finality requirement is incorporated in the third
Ozkok prong); see also Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting
the separate consideration of the finality rule); In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 (B.I.A.
1988).
90. See Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 226 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003).
91. Martinez-Montoya, 904 F.2d at 1021 (noting the separate consideration of the final-
ity rule).
92. 8 I. & N. Dec. 269, 270 (B.I.A. 1959).
93. 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551-52 (B.I.A. 1988).
94. Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he decision of the BIA to
apply a federal conviction standard in Ozkoh does not infringe at all, either explicitly or
implicitly, upon the Supreme Court's holding in Pino.").
95. In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (B.I.A. 1988).
96. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999).
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b. Reliance on Matter of M- Is Misplaced
The Moosa court also suggested finality rule abolishment by com-
paring the text of the IIRIRA definition of "conviction" with the rule
announced in Matter of M-.97 Matter of M- was decided by the Legaliza-
tion Appeals Unit ("LAU") of the INS, which hears appeals of denials
of applications for permanent resident status.98 The LAU in this case
stated that it was not bound by BIA precedent and could promulgate
its own rules, and proceeded to state a new, LAU-only framework for
determining sufficiency of conviction that dispensed with the finality
rule.99 Matter of M- was summarily overturned by the Fifth Circuit,
which found that the LAU is subordinate to and bound by BIA prece-
dent, including the Ozkok decision that references the finality rule.100
There are problems with this analysis, starting with the fact that
the IIRIRA definition is substantively different from the one unsuc-
cessfully promulgated in Matter of M-. Section 1101 (a) (48) (A) con-
tains an additional clause that creates one analysis for noncitizens for
whom there is a formal judgment of guilt and another for those whose
adjudication has been deferred; declaring the two rules to be the
same impermissibly reduces this additional clause to surplusage. 10 1
Furthermore, the Report makes no mention of Matter of M-, instead
stating that Congress is adopting the Ozkok rule sans the third prong
of the second part.10 2 It simply does not make sense to discern con-
gressional intent by looking to the discredited analysis of a division of
an INS administrative unit103 while ignoring the joint statement of the
House and Senate contained in the Report. 10 4 Had the Moosa court
substituted Ozkok for Matter of M- in its analysis, its logic would have
dictated that since Ozkok incorporated finality, Congress did so as well
when it adopted a slightly modified version of the Ozkok framework.
97. 19 I. & N. Dec. 861 (LAU 1989).
98. 4 GORDON ET AL., supra note 4, § 52.09 (2005).
99. Matter of M-, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 864-65.
100. Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1990).
101. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31(2001); Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d
393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998); infra Part III.C.1.
102. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 223-24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
103. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 999 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999).
104. Disabled in Action v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that a
conference report represents the final statement of terms agreed to by both houses and is
therefore the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent next to the statute itself).
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c. Moosa Incorrectly Cited Punu as Eliminating the Finality
Requirement
Moosa also relied on In re Punu'0 5 for the proposition that finality
is no longer a requirement.10 6 This reliance is overly broad, as the en
banc opinion in Punu specifically does not address whether finality is
an issue under the first part of the IIRIRA definition. 10 7 Punu dealt
with a defendant who was given a deferred adjudication under a Texas
statute allowing for further proceedings under certain circumstances,
a fact that he argued should negate the finality of his conviction.
1 0 8
The Punu court quickly dispensed with this argument after comparing
congressional intent with the Texas deferred adjudication statute. 10 9
The Report documenting congressional intent in including a def-
inition of "conviction" in the INA states:
In some States, adjudication may be "deferred" upon a finding or
confession of guilt, and a final judgment of guilt may not be im-
posed if the alien violates probation until there is an additional
proceeding regarding the alien's guilt or innocence. In such cases,
the third prong of the Ozkok definition prevents the original find-
ing or confession of guilt to be considered a "conviction" for de-
portation purposes. This new provision, by removing the third
prong of Ozkok, clarifies Congressional intent that even in cases
where adjudication is "deferred," the original finding or confession
of guilt is sufficient to establish a "conviction" for purposes of the
immigration laws.1 10
The Texas statute provides for deferred adjudication of guilt and
probation following a guilty or no contest plea when the court deter-
mines that doing so would best serve the interests of society.'' It fur-
ther provides that a violation of probation can result in re-opening of
105. 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (B.I.A. 1998) (en banc).
106. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1009 (referring to Punu as a case in which the BIA determined
that a deferred adjudication was a "conviction" without applying the finality rule). The
Moosa court's reliance on the BIA in this manner stems from the established principle that
courts should give deference to administrative interpretations of statutes that they are
given responsibility of administering, such as DHS's administration of the INA, as long as
that interpretation is based on a permissible construction. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
107. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 234 n.1 (Grant, J., concurring) ("[T]his opinion does not ad-
dress the circumstance of an alien against whom a formal adjudication of guilt has been
entered by a court, but who has pending a noncollateral post-judgment motion or direct
appeal.").
108. Id. at 225 (majority).
109. Id at 227.
110. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 223-24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (italics supplied); see also
infra Part III.B; supra Part I.B.
111. Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 227-29.
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adjudication of the original charge, in which a guilty adjudication will
result in the same proceedings and options (such as sentencing, pro-
bation, and appeals) that would have existed had there never been a
deferral. 112
The Texas statute thus provides for exactly the kind of deferred
adjudication that Congress intended the term "conviction" to encom-
pass when it added a statutory definition. 113 The Punu court acknowl-
edged the possibility that a future appeal right could vest should Punu
violate his probation and then be adjudicated guilty in a subsequent
proceeding. 114 However, the court found that the finality rule could
not be implicated because Congress specifically intended to obviate
the need to inquire into the mere possibility of future appellate review
where there is a deferred adjudication.' 15
Two of the judges in Punu wrote separately from the majority,
and each discussed the finality rule in some detail. Judge Rosenberg,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the Pino finality
rule should somehow bar removal when there is a deferred adjudica-
tion, despite the clear intent of Congress otherwise." 6 Judge Grant,
concurring, argued against this view, while specifically noting that the
en banc opinion does not address whether a "conviction" is sufficient
for immigration purposes where there is a pending direct appeal in a
case arising under the first part of § 1101 (a) (48) (A). 11 7 The en banc
Punu opinion was concerned with the relatively narrow question of
whether a deferred adjudication is a "conviction" under IIRIRA de-
spite the possibility of a right to appellate review arising should there
be a probation violation." 8 Reliance on Punu for a broader proposi-
tion of finality rule abrogation is thus inappropriate."19 Moosa con-
flated its analysis of the two parts of the definition by citing Punu in
this manner. Since Moosa also dealt with a deferred adjudication, it
should only be read to follow the BIA for the narrower interpretation
that Punu actually makes.
112. Id. at 228 n.3.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 228.
115. See id. at 228.
116. Id. at 235-36 (Rosenberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id. at 234 (Grant, J., concurring). The concurrence specifically notes "this opinion
does not address the circumstance of an alien against whom a formal adjudication of guilt
has been entered by a court, but who has pending a noncollateral post-judgment motion
or direct appeal." Id. at 234 n.1.
118. Id at 228 (majority); id at 234 (Grant, J., concurring).
119. Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2001).
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The Moosa court ended its finality rule discussion by indicating
that its interpretation was in accordance with the Chevron rule, which
determines when courts should defer to an administrative agency's in-
terpretation of a statute.1 20 The court found finality rule abrogation
under the first Chevron step, which asks whether Congress has spoken
directly to the precise issue before it,121 a question to be answered
employing traditional tools of statutory construction. 122 If there is am-
biguity, the second Chevron step calls for deference to the interpreta-
tion put forth by the administrative agency as long as it is a
"reasonable construction." 123 The Moosa court noted if it had found
that Congress had not spoken to the issue, the second step of Chevron
analysis would have reached the same result since the INS interpreta-
tion was the same as its own. 124 However, the Moosa INS brief does not
contain any argument on finality, 125 and the available evidence indi-
cates that the government has consistently avoided arguing that
IIRIRA displaces the finality rule.' 26 Furthermore, Congress can
hardly be said to have clearly spoken to that issue under the rules of
statutory construction.' 27 Alternatively, Moosa's statement that Con-
gress has clearly spoken is entirely reasonable if it refers to the ques-
tion of whether the finality rule bars removal where there is a deferred
adjudication. Assuming this to be the case also elucidates Moosa's sec-
ond statement referring to the INS construction as identical to its
own, as this can only refer to the BIA decision in Punu that addressed
this precise question. 128
Ultimately, the Moosa court's discussion of the finality rule is of
questionable value as precedent, not in the least because it discussed
120. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1010 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)).
122. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
123. Id. at 843.
124. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1010 n.9.
125. Sur-Reply Brief for Respondent, Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999) (No.
96-60821).
126. Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (INS was "careful" at oral argument
not to say that it could deport someone with pending appeal or appeal period); Govern-
ment's Answering Brief at 27 n.22, United States v. Bucio-Carrillo, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
15094 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-50352) ("to resolve this appeal, this court need not decide
whether" the IIRIRA definition "eliminated the finality requirement"). The only other ap-
pellate brief to be found that addresses this is the Montenegro brief which cites Moosa, dis-
cussed supra note 73 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Part II.B.l.a; infra Parts III.B-C.
128. In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec 224, 234 (Grant, J., concurring).
DEPORTATION AND MONTENEGROFall 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
an issue irrelevant in the case. 129 It has the additional problem of con-
flated analysis between the two parts of the IIRIRA definition of "con-
viction" in its overly broad citation of Punu. The court's insertion of
Matter of M- into the chain of events leading to the IIRIRA definition
of "conviction" is particularly troubling,130 as is its casual dismissal of
Moosa's contention that finality rule elimination could lead to the ab-
surd result of post-deportation reversal of a criminal conviction.131
The Moosa court's eagerness to find finality rule abolishment in a case
that did not actually implicate the issue 132 contributes to the appear-
ance that the Fifth Circuit tends to construe immigration statutes
against noncitizens. 133
129. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, if portions of an opinion "go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent
suit...." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821); see also United States v. Crawley, 837
F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988); see generally Richard B. Cappalli, What Is Authority? Crea-
tion and Use of Case Law ly Pennsylvania's Appellate Courts, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 303 (1999).
130. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1999).
131. Id. at 1009. The court stated in response to Moosa's argument, "Be that as it may,
such concerns are more properly addressed to Congress." Id This assertion ignores the
rule of statutory construction that courts should not construe a statute in a manner that
leads to absurd results. Given this rule, Moosa was correct to address this concern to the
Fifth Circuit, and the court should not have dismissed his claim without at least consider-
ing the possible absurd result of its interpretation. WILIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLA-
TION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 260-63 (2000); NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:12 (6th ed. 2000). The "tlassic example" of the absurd re-
sults canon is Green v. Bock Laundry Machine, in which the Supreme Court found an inter-
pretation of a rule of evidence to be absurd due to the potential constitutional issues it
engendered. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach., 490 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1989); id, at 527 (Scalia,
J., concurring); ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra, at 261. Given the constitutional issues raised by
an interpretation of § 1101 (a) (48) (A) that eliminates the finality rule as outlined infra Part
III.A, this would seem to be a situation in which usage of the absurd results canon would
have been appropriate.
132. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1009 n.8 (stating "whether the finality rule has survived is a
moot issue with regard to Moosa"). The finality rule issue does not receive mention in the
government's brief in the case. Sur-Reply Brief for Respondent, Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994
(5th Cir. 1999) (No. 96-60821).
133. The Fifth Circuit has also held that a conviction previously vacated on appeal on
the merits or for procedural or constitutional defects is a basis for removal under the
IIRIRA definition of "conviction," leaving it alone among the circuits in this regard. See
Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 2002); id. at 820-23 (Benavides, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the majority for "painting with too broad a brush"); see also Cruz-
Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting the Fifth Circuit's "ten-
uous adherence to a categorical disregard of all vacaturs"); Barbara Hines, Immigration
Law, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 923, 931-934 (2004) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's decision is
"wrong and unfair," with "disastrous consequences for noncitizens"). The Fifth Circuit re-
cently appeared ready to reconsider Renteria-Gonzalez when it granted en banc review in a
case raising this issue. The government's response rendered the case moot by changing its
position and indicating that it is undertaking a "policy review" on pursuing such cases.
Discipio v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 472, 474-75 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying and criticizing Renteria-
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Given these issues, Moosa should only be read to confirm that a
deferred adjudication is a "conviction" for immigration purposes, and
its dicta on the finality rule should not be relied upon. At the time of
this Note, while several opinions cite Moosa when appellant nonci-
tizens attempt to use the finality rule to stop removal based on their
deferred adjudications,13 4 Montenegro remains the only decision to cite
Moosa on the topic of conviction outside of this context.
2. Griffiths Did Not Put Forth the Proposition that Montenegro
Purports to Follow
The Montenegro court's other source for its holding that the final-
ity rule no longer exists is Giffiths v. INS.135 However, Griffiths contra-
dicts Montenegro's statement more than it supports it. Gniffiths again
deals with the question of finality of conviction where there is a de-
ferred adjudication with a theoretical future right to appeal. The
court applied the BIA's Punu standard, found a "conviction" for immi-
gration purposes, and upheld deportation.13 6
Unlike the conflated analysis in Moosa, the Griffiths court was care-
ful to distinguish between the two parts of the statutory definition of
"conviction." The court explicitly limited its holding, noting that the
BIA in Punu
did not address the meaning of the first prong of INA§ 1101 (a) (48) (A), governing cases where there is a "formal judg-
ment of guilt" . . . . Since we address petitioner's case here under
the second test, we likewise do not address any finality require-
ments for finding a conviction under this first prong.13 7
By citing Griffiths in a case that comes under the first part of
§ 1101 (a) (48) (A) dealing with a formal judgment, Montenegro cited
Griffiths for a holding it explicitly refused to reach. 138
Not only did the Griffiths court stop short of the proposition that
Montenegro would ascribe to it, but it contradicts that proposition. The
court noted in Griffiths that the "INS was careful at oral argument to
say that it was not taking the position it could deport someone adjudi-
Gonzaez); Discipio v. Ashcroft, 417 F.3d 448, 449-50 (5th Cir. 2005) (dismissing for moot-
ness based on the government's new position). Together, the broad holdings of Renteria-
Gonzalez and Moosa each would seem to go against the longstanding rule of lenity that calls
for immigration statutes to be construed in favor of the noncitizen. See infra Part III.C.2.
134. See, e.g., Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436 at 447-48 (5th Cir. 2005);
Madriz-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2004).
135. 243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
136. See id. at 52.
137. Id. at 53 n.3.
138. I&
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cated guilty while their appeal or appeal period was pending,"139 and
that it makes sense to take a different view of availability of direct ap-
peal between the two prongs.1 40 Somewhat ironically, given the later
use of Giffiths by Montenegro and (by extension) Galarza-Solis, the
court summarily dismissed the noncitizen's contention that ruling
against him on this argument would allow the INS to deport in cases
where there is a pending direct appeal, saying that "[t]his is simply
not the case." 141 Since the court found that the finality rule does not
apply under the second part, taking a different view of the finality rule
under the first part can only mean its continued application. Rather
than supporting Montenegro's ruling as interpreted by Galarza-Solis, the
Griffiths court intimated that it would apply the finality rule in cases
arising under the first part of § 1101 (a) (48) (A).142
The court in Montenegro was ultimately too quick to find annul-
ment of the finality rule-that is, if the court can truly be said to have
done so in a purposive sense. Overall, it is likely that the Montenegro
court never intended to make any new case law regarding the finality
rule as is imputed to it by Galarza-Solis, and Montenegro's broad lan-
guage on finality is the consequence of a poorly drafted decision that
fails to take into account the distinction between the two parts of the
IIRIRA definition of "conviction." Whether or not the Montenegro
court intended to eliminate finality rule protection for noncitizens in
its jurisdiction, Galarza-Solis demonstrates that this is the result of the
decision. 143 However, there are substantial arguments for the neces-
sity of the finality rule's survival in the context of the first part of
§ 1101 (a) (48) (A).
I. IRIRA Should Not Be Read to Eliminate the Finality
Rule
Deporting someone on the basis of a criminal conviction prior to
exhaustion or waiver of the right to appeal raises a series of problems.
The ensuing constitutional concerns, absence of congressional intent
to abrogate the finality rule, and application of rules of statutory con-
struction require that a finding of guilt arising under the first prong
139. Id. at 54.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 54 ("There are substantial practical differences between the situation faced
by a defendant currently exercising a direct appellate right and that faced by a defendant
with a theoretically available right to appeal that lay dormant until and unless the case is
later brought forward .. ").
143. Galarza-Solis, No. 03-C-9188, 2004 WL 728199, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2004).
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of the IIRIRA definition of "conviction" should not be considered suf-
ficient for immigration purposes until final.
A. Constitutional Problems Arising from Displacement of the
Finality Rule
Abrogation of the right to appeal violates principles of federalism
through interference with state criminal procedure; it also gives rise to
issues related to access to the courts and due process guarantees at
both the state and federal level.
1. Violation of Principles of Federalism Through Abrogation of
the Right to Appeal
The principle that places the administration of criminal justice
within the province of the states lies at the core of the federalist struc-
ture of the United States. 144 In recognition of this fundamental aspect
of state sovereignty, the Supreme Court has promulgated a doctrine
of abstention that prevents federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
in a manner that would interfere with state criminal proceedings. 145
Professor Redish has sought to discern the judicial bases for this fed-
eral deference, finding one to be avoiding interference with substan-
tive state legislative goals. 146 He makes note of the Court's emphasis
on avoiding a disruption of a state's efforts to protect the interests
underlying its criminal laws through its judiciary.' 47 The right to ap-
peal qualifies as just such an effort.
Forty-seven states and the federal government provide for at least
one direct appeal as-of-right to all those convicted under a criminal
statute.148 Many states enshrine this right in their constitutions.' 49 The
144. T-E FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the "ordinary adminis-
tration of criminal and civil justice" is the "one transcendent advantage belonging to the
province of the State governments").
145. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986) (citingYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46
(1971)).
146. Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Ratio-
nale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 468-70, 472 (1978).
147. Id. at 469.
148. U.S. DEP'T OFJJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION
1998, at 173-75 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco9804.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2005). New Hampshire, Virginia, and West Virginia provide only dis-
cretionary appeals, although procedural requirements in these states provide for a
mandatory level of review at the oral argument level for such appeals. Mark M. Arkin,
Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appea4 39 UCLA L. REv. 503, 513-14 n.50
(1992).
149. Fifteen states provided a constitutional right as of 1992. Arkin, supra note 148, at
516-17 n.64.
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"tough on crime" trend of the last two decades has not changed the
consonance of the states on the importance of this right as fundamen-
tal to our legal system. 150 The right of appeal is considered so indis-
pensable in establishing certainty of guilt that a plurality of appellate
courts will vacate the conviction and dismiss the original indictment if
a defendant dies before his appeal is heard.151 Inherent in these facts
is an enduring consensus on the part of state legislatures that provid-
ing a right of direct appeal is essential in determining who is guilty
and who is innocent, an interest that cuts to the foundation of crimi-
nal law and procedure. 152 Indeed, it has been argued that the very
legitimacy of the criminal justice system in the eyes of society is tied to
the right to appeal a trial verdict.153 Eliminating the finality rule is
tantamount to abolishing this right as held by noncitizens; 154 contin-
ued application of the finality rule avoids implicating the powerful
state interest at stake.
Principles of federalism also counsel against finding that Con-
gress has preempted the right of direct appeal. Plenary power over
immigration and the Supremacy Clause 155 means that there is field
preemption of state immigration regulations and other state regula-
tions that conflict with federal immigration goals. However, this rule
150. SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("There
are few, if any, situations in our system ofjustice in which a single judge is given unreview-
able discretion over matters concerning a person's liberty or property, and the reversal rate
of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts, while not overwhelming,
is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal would
expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction."); see also AM. BAR ASS'N
CRIMINAL JUsTIcE STANDARDS: CRIMINAL APPEALS § 21-1.1 (1980), available at http://
www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/crimappealsblk.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2005)
("The possibility of appellate review of trial courtjudgments should exist for every criminal
conviction. It is undesirable to have any class of case in which such trial court determina-
tions are unreviewable.").
151. This is done under the doctrine of abatement ab initio. See Rosanna Cavallaro,
Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right to Appeal 73 U. COLO. L. REv.
943, 943-46 (2002).
152. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404 (1985) (noting that states have "made the appeal
the final step in the adjudication of guilt or innocence of the individual").
153. Cavallaro, supra note 151, at 977-85.
154. Some states will dismiss the appeal of a deported criminal appellant on grounds of
mootness, negating effectiveness of the appeal. See People v. Shaw, 654 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997); State v. Castano, No. 88-02822, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 7259 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Nov. 7, 1989). Others will allow the appeal to continue, as winning will remove the
conviction that stands as a bar to reentry. People v. Garcia, 89 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004); Cuellar v. State, 13 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Tex. App. 2000); State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229,
1230 (Wash. 1989).
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that laws of the United
States preempt state laws. Id.
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does not extend to the preemption of state laws unrelated to immigra-
tion when doing so is unnecessary to achieving the federal interest,
and there is no clear and manifest intent by Congress to effect an
ouster of state power. 15 6 Simply waiting to institute removal proceed-
ings until the right to appeal is exhausted or waived, as has been done
for decades, would fulfill both state and federal goals without diluting
either; the only real difference from the federal government's per-
spective is the timing of when it will bear the cost of imprisonment
during removal proceedings, a meaningless consideration since the
cost itself remains the same. If anything, waiting will lower ICE ex-
penses and improve the government's ability to give adequate atten-
tion to each removal case in the overburdened immigration courts,
157
since it will never have to expend time and money on imprisoning
and deporting anyone who will ultimately be successful on appeal.'
58
The First Circuit and a federal district court in Texas have found
that treating a deferred adjudication as a "conviction" does not violate
principles of federalism through the interference with state criminal
adjudications due to congressional plenary power.15 9 However, this is
distinct from the denial of the right to appeal. Congress has not indi-
cated any intent on the face of the statute or in the Report to deny the
right of appeal, whereas it has explicitly indicated the intent to treat a
deferred adjudication as a "conviction." 160 Congress has therefore
clearly intended to preempt the state's power to affect the purpose of
a deferred adjudication. 16 1 Plenary power should not be invoked to
justify an act that Congress cannot definitively be said to have taken.
Furthermore, abrogation of the right to appeal in a case like Galarza-
156. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-59 (1976); League of United Latin Am. Citi-
zens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
157. See Claire Cooper & Emily Bazar, Immigration Appeals Swamp Federal Courts, SACRA-
MENTo BEE, Sept. 5, 2004, at Al.
158. This lack of intent and interest in negating the appeal right as held by noncitizens
is discussed further infra at Part III.B. This lack of a government interest also has implica-
tions for an argument based on equal protection. A reading of § 1101 (a) (48) (A) that finds
it to abrogate the right of appeal as held by noncitizens creates a classification between
citizens and noncitizens that requires a rational basis to pass constitutional muster. While
courts will generally uphold immigration statutes that make such distinctions, it is worth-
while to note that the one area where a court has struck down such a classification involved
a limitation on access to the courts. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 94 (1976)
(specifying rational basis review for alienage classifications); Yang Bi Kei v. Am. Int'l Knit-
ters Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1074, 1078-79 (N.D. Mar. I. 1992) (refusing to find government
expediency to be a rational basis for denying noncitizens equal access to a court of law).
159. Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 206 F.3d 299, 307-08 (1st Cir. 2000); Bui v. Ashcroft, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1565, *6-*8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 1, 2003).
160. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 223-24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
161. Herrera-Inirio, 206 F.3d at 306-08.
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Solis is a direct interference with an ongoing state proceeding, while
proceedings are at a halt where there is a deferred adjudication. A
deferred adjudication is typically granted in exchange for an admis-
sion of guilt. 162 Removal under such circumstances therefore does not
impact the state's interest in determining guilt or innocence as does
removal where the appellant has contested guilt at trial and continues
to do so on direct appeal, since such an appeal constitutes an adjudi-
cation on the merits.' 63 Finally, the right to appeal is on a much
stronger footing 64 than any right related to an effective deferred ad-
judication that may exist. Under these circumstances, a principle of
"cooperative federalism" calls for continued application of the finality
rule. 16 5
2. Constitutional Problems at the State Level
Noncitizens are "persons" entitled to the protection of the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. 66 Those convicted after trial have
the right to meet with their attorneys in order to pursue appeals
through the due process guarantee of access to the courts. 167 Remov-
ing an appellant from the country negates this right. Those seeking
exoneration also have the right to a "reasonably adequate opportu-
nity" to present claims to the court, be it through access to law librar-
ies or some other method. 168 Removal to a foreign country will, in
most cases, cut off meaningful access to the laws and jurisprudence of
the United States, damaging the opportunity to present a claim.
In addition, state appellate proceedings are subject to some level
of constitutional due process, including at least the right to a trial
transcript and an attorney.169 The Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of the first appeal as of right, holding that a criminal ap-
162. See Visosky v. State, 953 S.W.2d 819, 820 (1997) (deferred adjudications in Texas
are available only in exchange for a guilty plea); John Bradley, Criminal Law 101 for Your
First Guilty Plea, 67 TEX. BJ. 230, 233 (2004); Haught, supra note 27, at 348.
163. Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 2587 (2005).
164. In addition to its long history, the right to appeal is subject to other constitutional
protections. See infra notes 165-67.
165. Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles, 202 F.3d 1074, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000).
166. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543, 546 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893)).
167. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419-21 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411 (1989). The Sixth Amendment applies to the
'accused" regardless of citizenship status. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
168. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
825 (1977)).




pellant is guaranteed certain minimum safeguards to ensure that such
an appeal is "adequate and effective." 170 It is not difficult to see how
the higher costs and difficulties inherent in pursuing an appeal in a
United States court while located in a foreign country, particularly for
an appellant who lacks resources or language skills in the country of
removal, may severely damage the effectiveness of an appeal. Further-
more, removal renders an appeal completely ineffective in jurisdic-
tions that will dismiss an appeal as moot when the defendant is
deported. 171 Those convicted of controlled substance violations or
crimes of moral turpitude (such as subway turnstile jumping) 172 are
subject to a permanent bar to reentry. 173 Noncitizens in such a juris-
diction are thus subject to a permanent punishment without the possi-
bility of even one appeal. Those convicted of aggravated felonies are
subject to a twenty-year bar to reentry, with all others subject to a ten-
year bar. 174
Of course, unlike in Griffin and Douglas, the due process violation
in the state appellate proceeding here is effectuated by the federal
government, not the state. The First Circuit in Herrera-Inirio v. INS1 7
5
has justified due process concerns arising from negation of the validity
and effectiveness of a state deferred adjudication by pointing to an
underlying congressional purpose in creating a nationally uniform
definition of the term "conviction" for immigration purposes. 176 The
court also noted that the liberty interest in having a deferred adjudica-
tion given full effect is not fundamental. 177 However, the right to ap-
peal benefits from much deeper roots, and its universal nature does
not impact considerations of uniformity. The Herrera-Inirio court's jus-
170. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392 (1985). The Evitts Court found a due process
violation where ineffective assistance of counsel prevented appellate review; in some states,
deportation will prevent appellate review as well. See People v. Shaw, 654 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997); State v. Castano, No. 88-02822, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 7259 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Nov. 7, 1989).
171. Some states will dismiss the appeal of a deported criminal appellant on grounds of
mootness, negating effectiveness of the appeal. See Shaw, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 886; Castano, 1989
Fla. App. LEXIS 7259. Others will allow the appeal to continue, as winning will remove the
conviction that stands as a bar to reentry. People v. Garcia, 89 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004); Cuellar v. State, 13 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Tex. App. 2000); State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229,
1230 (Wash. 1989).
172. Morawetz, supra note 50, at 1941.
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i) (2000).
174. Id. § 1182(a) (9) (A) (ii).
175. 208 F.3d 299 (1st Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 308-09.
177. Id.
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tifications are inapplicable to the due process deprivation caused by
Montenegro.
3. Due Process Considerations at the Federal Level
A deportation based on a criminal conviction when there is a
pending appeal also creates due process questions in the federal re-
moval proceeding. Noncitizens receive lower due process protections
in the immigration context.178 The Supreme Court has held that judi-
cial review of due process in a removal proceeding is limited to deter-
mining whether the procedures used meet an essential standard of
fairness. 179 Factors for determining whether procedures have met this
fairness standard include the interest at stake for the individual, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, the probable value of
additional procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government
in using the current procedures. 180 The interest at stake for the indi-
vidual is that of fundamental liberty, as deportation deprives nonci-
tizens of "the right to stay and live and work in this land of
freedom." 181 This is accompanied by the interest in having an oppor-
tunity to appeal a criminal conviction at trial, an interest that is ne-
gated by deportation in some jurisdictions.182 The "probable value" of
the direct appeal right could scarcely be higher. 183 Since Congress has
not articulated the intent, much less any related interest, to deport
noncitizens whose appeal has yet to be heard, discerning such an in-
terest is an exercise in speculation. Such speculation should not justify
denial of the concrete liberty interest at stake for the individual.
It is also necessary to examine the abrogation of due process in
the context of the increased willingness by Congress and the courts to
discriminate against noncitizens after the September 11 attacks. 184
Comparing the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Zadvydas v. Da-
visl85 and Demore v. HyungJoon Kim186 reveals the scope of post-IIRIRA
178. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 720 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Demore v.
HyungJoon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003); id. at 543 (SouterJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
179. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982).
180. Id. at 34.
181. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
182. People v. Shaw, 654 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); State v. Castano, No. 88-
02822, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 7259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1989).
183. See supra Parts III.A.1-2.
184. LAWYER'S COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND
SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 31-47 (Fiona Doherty & Deborah
Pearlstein eds., 2003).
185. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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noncitizen due process and how that scope is constricted after Sep-
tember 11, with the two cases dealing with similar issues but reaching
opposite conclusions. 187 The Court in Zadvydas considered a chal-
lenge to an IIRIRA provision that appears to allow potentially indefi-
nite detention of criminal noncitizen aliens past the ninety-day
removal period following issuance of a removal order.188 Zadvydas
held that such indefinite detention of noncitizens would violate con-
stitutional due process, and that the provision must therefore be read
as limiting post-removal-period detention to a period of time reasona-
bly necessary to effect removal from the United States to avoid such a
violation.' 8 9 The Court makes particular note of the complete lack of
congressional intent to authorize indefinite detention in its ruling.' 90
Two years later, the Court in Demore held that IIRIRA-instituted
mandatory detention without individualized bail hearings during re-
moval proceedings does not violate due process.' 91 The Demore Court
cited statistics relied on by Congress showing that many noncitizens
with past criminal convictions failed to appear for their removal hear-
ings as well as precedent for allowing mandatory detention during re-
moval proceedings. 192 The Court distinguished the temporary period
of detention at issue in Demore from the indefinite and potentially per-
manent detention challenged in Zadvydas. It also contrasted Demore's
denial of a procedural right during removal proceedings with the
post-removal proceeding liberty interest at stake in Zadvydas in which
the immigration purpose of the detention no longer exists.' 93 Signifi-
cantly, the Demore Court noted at the outset of its analysis that the
respondent's prior convictions were "obtained following the full pro-
cedural protections our criminal justice system offers.' 94
The denial of the right to appeal a criminal conviction and the
use of a non-final appeal in removal proceedings engendered by Mon-
tenegro is closer to Zadvydas than Demore. There is no Demore-like study
186. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
187. Zadvydas interpreted an IIRIRA detention provision before the September 11 at-
tacks and found a due process violation, while Demore interpreted a related provision and
reached the opposite conclusion after the attacks and subsequent anti-immigrant backlash.
See Yoh Nago, Comment, Demore v. Kim: Is the Supreme Court Decreasing the Rights of Lawful
Permanent Residents?, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rrv. 1715, 1725-26 (2004).
188. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
189. Id. at 690, 699.
190. Id. at 697.
191. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 528.
192. Id. at 518, 523-26.
193. Id. at 527-29.
194. Id. at 513.
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or congressional finding tojustify the denial of due process; 195 there is
instead a complete lack of affirmative congressional intent or indicia
of purpose for such denial, 196 as in Zadvydas. Denying the right to
direct appeal is a denial of one of the core procedural protections of
our criminal justice system, the fulfillment of which Demore implies is
justification for lower procedural protections in deportation proceed-
ings based upon a criminal conviction.1 97 The liberty interest at stake
is serious, encompassing a potentially permanent sanction as in
Zadvydas, unlike the temporary detention in Demore. Taken together,
Zadvydas and Demore strongly indicate that the denial of the right to
appeal arising from Montenegro interferes with due process guarantees
to an impermissible degree. As the Supreme Court did with the
IIRIRA provision challenged in Zadvydas, the IIRIRA definition of
"conviction" for immigration purposes should be interpreted to main-
tain the finality rule in order to avoid constitutional due process
concerns.
Interpreting the IIRIRA definition of "conviction" to eliminate
the finality rule causes too many constitutional issues for such an in-
terpretation to stand. It is well-established that if a construction of a
statute raises constitutional problems, courts must accept a "fairly pos-
sible" alternative interpretation of that statute that avoids such ques-
tions.198 As shown in the remainder of this Note, legislative intent and
canons of statutory construction easily support an interpretation of
the IIRIRA definition of "conviction" that leaves the Pino finality rule
intact.
B. Legislative Intent and Montenegro's Results Weigh Against
Finding Abolishment of the Finality Rule
The most important reason for finding that the finality rule sur-
vives IIRIRA is the complete lack of intent to eliminate the finality rule
combined with the constitutional problems that result from such elim-
ination. A House Conference Report is considered the most influen-
tial type of legislative history since it reflects the final statement of
terms agreed upon by both houses of Congress. 199 The Report on
195. Id. at 518-19.
196. See infta Part III.B.
197. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
198. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001). This rule is accepted even by those
who advocate looking exclusively at the plain language of a statute to discern its meaning.
See infra note 213.
199. Disabled in Action v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2000);JAMES WIJARD
HURST, DEAUNG WITH STATUTES 42 (1982).
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IIRIRA is remarkably explicit and clear in expressing its purposes of
including deferred adjudications under the definition of "conviction"
and treating any court-ordered sentence as being "actually im-
posed."200 It is difficult to discern any additional purpose Congress
had in creating the statutory definition of "conviction" other than the
two explicitly stated.20 1 It is a principle of statutory construction that
courts should not presume that a statute is intended by the legislature
to overthrow long-established principles of law unless that intention is
made clear though express declaration or by necessary implication. 202
If Congress intended to abolish the long-standing finality rule as well
as further its two stated purposes, it seems overwhelmingly likely that
the Report would explicitly reflect this, but no such intent is manifest
or implied. Outside of Moosa's mischaracterization, 20 3 there is no basis
for asserting that removal of the third prong of the second part of the
Ozkok rule implicitly eliminates the finality rule. Thus, it is inappropri-
ate to find that Congress intended to abolish the well-established final-
ity rule given this absence of express declaration or necessary
implication.20 4
The proposition that Congress did not intend to abrogate the fi-
nality rule is buttressed by the difficulty in discerning any interest
served by such abrogation. A substantial percentage of state criminal
convictions are reversed on appeal, 205 and the BIA and federal courts
are barely able to cope with the tide of immigration appeals as it is.2°6
The finality rule serves to reduce this workload by keeping successful
criminal appellants out of the immigration courts. While a criminal
appellant may not necessarily be imprisoned during the pendency of
his or her appeal and is thus capable of committing more crimes,
200. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 223-24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
201. See supra Part I.B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has come to the same con-
clusion in dicta; Lujan-Armendariz v. INS., 222 F.3d 728, 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2000).
202. SINGER, supra note 131, § 45:12.
203. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
204. Cf Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 742 n.23 (noting that it appears Congress was not
concerned with altering the longstanding rule that convictions that are subsequently over-
ruled no longer have any effect for immigration purposes).
205. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956); see alsoJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mark M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right
to a CriminalAppeal, 39 UCLA L. REv. 503, 513-16 (1992) (outlining statistical evidence on
frequency of reversal on appeal); Judge Jon 0. Newman, Study: A Study of Appellate Rever-
sals, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 629, 633 (1992).
206. See Cooper & Bazar, supra note 157, at Al. (discussing IIRIRA's impact on the
burden placed on immigration and appeals courts by deportation cases). The Patriot Act
and other post-September 11 policy choices have greatly compounded this problem. See
generally LAWYER'S COMM. FOR HuMAN RiGi-rs, supra note 184, at 31-49.
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there is no reason to believe that noncitizens are any more likely to do
this than citizens. This is particularly true since all available data indi-
cates that the immigrant crime rate is lower than that for citizens. 20 7
Since the finality rule is limited in the types of appeals it covers among
the myriad available to criminal defendants, 20 8 the delay created by
the finality rule in deporting the majority of convicts who will end up
losing on those appeals is not great; noncitizens can still be deported
without having access to forms of relief from their convictions that are
available to citizens. The Supreme Court recently justified the need to
avoid delay in deportation due to the prolonged violation of federal
law inherent in any delay in deporting someone who is removable
under the INA.209 However, this justification cannot be bootstrapped
into determining the threshold question of removability.2 10 In any
case, simply waiting to institute removal proceedings until direct ap-
peal is exhausted or waived does not prevent the government from
achieving its interest in deporting criminal noncitizens.
Overall, it is difficult to see any legitimate, non-invidious interest
or purpose that is served through needlessly expending limited ICE
resources on trying to deport any number of people whose erroneous
convictions will be overturned through normal judicial process.
Ultimately, the lack of legislative intent to abolish the finality rule
combined with the dramatic consequences of such annulment weighs
heavily in favor of the rule's survival. The practical value of this princi-
ple-that innocuous legislation should not be read to make radical
changes-is revealed when one considers the current legislative pro-
cess; omnibus enactments, such as the 750-page bill that includes
IIRIRA, are error-prone and are probably not written or read by those
who vote on them. 211 The omnibus budget bill that contains IIRIRA
was passed in September 1996 just hours ahead of a deadline that
207. See generally Daniel P. Mears, Immigration and Crime: What's the Connection?, 14 FED.
SENT'G REP. 284 (2002).
208. SeeMorales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172,174-75 (9th Cir. 1981) (limiting finality
rule to direct appeals available as-of-right and excluding discretionary appeals).
209. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (1999).
210. Id. at 490. The plaintiffs in this case were unquestionably removable due to over-
staying visas and failure to maintain student status. Id.
211. SeeJohn M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 263, 282 n.66 (2000); see also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DuKE L.J. 389, 399 (discussing a $603.9 billion
appropriations bill passed without being read by members of Congress); Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that it is not surpris-
ing that IIRIRA contains an error); id. at 501 (Souter,J., concurring) (noting that IIRIRA
manages to simultaneously grant and deny judicial review to certain aliens in deportation
proceedings before April 1, 1997).
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would have forced a government shutdown of the type that remained
fresh in the minds of voters from the prior year.21 2 The potential for
unintended and undesirable results when such bills are meshed into
the ever-expanding opus that is the United States Code is high.213
The absence of legislative intent or purpose in eliminating the
finality rule is, in a mode of statutory interpretation that has attained
prominence and increasing acceptance through the efforts of former
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice John Paul Stevens, analogous to
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's "dog that didn't bark."214 Doyle's short story
Silver Blaze is famous for its exchange between Sherlock Holmes and a
policeman as Holmes explains how he has solved a case of murder
and horse theft:
[Inspector Gregory]: Is there any point to which you would wish to
draw my attention?
[Holmes]: To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.
[Inspector Gregory]: The dog did nothing in the night-time.
[Holmes]: That was the curious incident. 21 5
The stable watchdog's failure to bark is the clue that tells Holmes
that whoever took the horse from the stable was known to the dog;
therefore, the horse had not been stolen in the manner previously
212. Jerry Gray, Senate Approves a Big Budget Bill, Beating Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1996 at Al.
213. This fact was the deciding factor in a recent 8-1 Supreme Court decision applying
this principle to reform an anomalous tax code provision. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460, 468-69 (2004) (analogizing lack of congressional intent to
change tax code clause to Doyle's dog that did not bark); id at 470 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (Congress is "fully capable" of enacting errors into law). This near-unanimous en-
dorsement represents the strongest support for this rule yet. See id. at 470 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987) ("All in all, we think
this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's 'dog
that didn't bark,' that an amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have
been differently described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor
manager of the bill.").
214. First appearing in dissents by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, this rule gained
much favor following the former's ascension to Chief Justice. Compare Koons, 125 S. Ct. at
468-49, and Church of Scientology, 484 U.S. 9, 17-19, and Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528
U.S. 152, 159 (2000), and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991), and Am.
Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1991), with Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 589 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
446 U.S. 578, 596, 600, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). This principle, sans Sherlock
Holmes references, has found its way into lower court decisions as well, including in the
Seventh Circuit. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (justifying
continued application of the long-standing teacher exception to the copyright work-for-
hire doctrine despite no mention of it one way or the other in the 1976 Copyright Act).
215. 1 SIR ARTHuR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335,
347 (Doubleday & Co. 1956) (1892).
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assumed. If Congress truly intended to eliminate the finality rule,
surely some sound would have been heard.
C. Canons of Statutory Construction Weigh in Favor of the Finality
Rule's Survival
Although the use of rules of statutory construction and legislative
intent as interpretive devices have been a commonplace factor in Su-
preme Court decisions over the last century, their use is not com-
pletely uncontroversial. 216 Such considerations are generally favored
by those who subscribe to intentionalist or dynamic theories of statu-
tory construction. 21 7 Textualists, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, tend to
reject consultation of legislative history out of hand; they also tend to
feel that the so-called canons of statutory construction are too vague
and artificial to constitute a consistent theory and are so numerous as
to support opposing interpretations of a single statute. 218 Recent Su-
preme Court use of the Sherlock Holmes rule is anathema to textual-
ists. 21 9 Despite such issues, even the most hardened textualist is willing
to apply certain rules as being fundamental. 220 An array of canons of
construction justify preservation of the finality rule, several of which
are discussed in Judge Rosenberg's concurring and dissenting opinion
in Punu221 and other sections of this Note; this section highlights two
whose use is longstanding and widely accepted even by those with dif-
fering viewpoints concerning interpretive canons. 222
216. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 131, at 240-41.
217. See generally id. The intentionalist theory of statutory interpretation seeks to give
effect to legislative intent or purpose, while a dynamic theory takes into account normative
considerations and the moral reality underlying statutory text. Textualist theories seek to
give effect to the "plain meaning of the statutory text." Id. at 213, 220, 223, 236-37.
218. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATrER OF INTERPRE-
TATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13-14, 27-29 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997)
(stating thatjudges "have no intelligible theory of what we do most," positing that interpre-
tive canons are "a lot of trouble," and characterizing the common law derogation rule as a
"sheer judicial power grab"); ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 131, at 369 (describing Llewel-
lyn's list of canons and counter-canons).
219. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460, 476 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (2004) (deriding the "Canon of Canine Silence").
220. Justice Scalia's overall suspicion of canons of statutory construction has not pre-
vented him from applying the long-established canons avoiding absurd results and consti-
tutional issues, nor from endorsing the rule of lenity. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note
131, at 260-61, 350; Scalia, supra note 218, at 29.
221. In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 242-55 (B.I.A. 1998).
222. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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1. A Statute May Not Be Construed So as to Render a Provision
Superfluous
Finding that the finality rule no longer applies under the first
prong of § 1101 (a) (48) (A) risks rendering a portion of the second
prong superfluous. It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation
that statutes should be construed so that no provision is rendered su-
perfluous. 223 The first part of the definition refers to "conviction" as
encompassing a "formal judgment of guilt," while the second part cov-
ers situations where "a judge or jury has found the alien guilty," and
there is some punishment imposed. 224 Fundamentally, this means that
a "formal judgment of guilt" must mean something more than a find-
ing of guilt by a judge or a jury; otherwise, this portion of the second
prong is not needed.225 If they mean the same thing, the "finding of
guilt by a judge or a jury" clause of the second prong could be re-
moved without altering the meaning of the statute. Conversely, if no
assumption that Congress intended to eliminate the finality rule is
made, a construction that interprets "formal judgment of guilt" to
mean a finding of guilt by a judge or ajury followed by exhaustion or
waiver of the right to appeal will avoid violation of this cardinal princi-
ple by recognizing that the appeal is the "final step in the adjudication
of guilt or innocence." 226 Such a construction is in line with the Ozkok
court's use of the term "formal judgment of guilt" to incorporate a
finality consideration, an important factor since Congress has adopted
a modified Ozkok test without indicating any intent to change the first
part of the definition.
227
2. Rule of Lenity Requires Continued Application of the Finality
Rule
The rule of lenity provides that any ambiguity in a criminal stat-
ute should be construed in favor of the defendant. 228 The origins of
this rule date to the very origins of English common law, allowing for
223. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393,
398 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
224. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000).
225. Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).
226. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404 (1985).
227. 19 1. & N. Dec. 546, 551 (B.I.A. 1988); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 223-24
(1996) (Conf. Rep.)
228. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978).
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its embrace by textualists. 229 While deportation is technically a civil
proceeding, as opposed to a criminal matter,230 it has been recog-
nized that its severity "surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal
penalties," and that it may result in the loss of "all that makes life
worth living."23 1 These considerations are particularly critical in the
case of removal of a long-term legal permanent resident.232 There has
been commentary calling for deportation to be treated as a criminal
penalty dating to the founding of this nation. 233 In addition, use of
the rule in the immigration context may also stem from the recogni-
zance that noncitizens are particularly at risk for political scapegoat-
ing since they lack the right to vote, a consideration noted recently by
the Supreme Court.23 4 Another theory posits that the immigration
rule of lenity stems from the Supreme Court's reluctance to directly
address constitutional challenges to immigration regulations due to its
desire to avoid addressing the tensions between plenary power and
competing constitutional mandates. 235 For these reasons, it is long es-
tablished that the rule of lenity applies in the immigration context,
and that a court should therefore not construe an immigration statute
against a noncitizen without unambiguous intent from Congress that
it should do so. 2 3 6
The rule of lenity comes into play when lingering ambiguity per-
sists after consultation of the text of the statute, legislative history, and
other canons of statutory construction; it thus serves as the "canon of
229. Scalia, supra note 218, at 29 (the rule of lenity is "validated by sheer antiquity");
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("The rule that penal laws are
to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself.").
230. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
231. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276 (1922); see also Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 322 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (stating that depor-
tation is the "equivalent of banishment or exile").
232. See Valerie Neal, Note, Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune: The Deportation of
"Aggravated Felons," 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1619, 1621-23 (2005) (outlining the story of
Jose Velasquez, who was deported in 1998 and thus separated from his wife of thirty-four
years and three children for referring a friend to a man potentially selling cocaine at a
party in 1980).
233. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Re-
movals and the 1996 Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INTr'L
L. J. 245, 261-73 (2004).
234. Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 515, 522 (2003).
235. Id.
236. Id at 521-22; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ("Since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will
not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required
by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.").
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last resort."237 The text of § 1101 (a) (48) (A) certainly gives no insight
into whether it affects the finality rule, and the legislative history is
similarly unilluminating. 23 8 Other rules of statutory construction
weigh towards finding finality rule survival, but an analysis that con-
strues the finality rule as within the Ozkok definition of "conviction"
leads to the conclusion that it has been displaced. 239 Contrasting the
Montenegro court's offhand dismissal of the rule with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's continued application of itjust months later in Garcia-Echaverria
further demonstrates the ambiguity concerning the survival of the fi-
nality rule. The language discussing the finality rule in these two deci-
sions indicates that each court viewed its treatment of the rule as
uncontroversial, even obvious.2 40 That there is ambiguity within an
IIRIRA provision is not surprising. 24 1 Given the harsh nature of depor-
tation and the bars to reentry into the United States that result,2 42
courts should resolve this ambiguity24 3 in favor of noncitizens and
continue to apply the finality rule.
237. Slocum, supra note 234, at 520 n.21.
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (48) (A) (2000); supra Part III.B.
239. This is shown in the dueling Punu concurring and dissenting opinions. Compare In
re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 248-50 (Rosenberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that "sound principles of statutory construction" counsel against silent abro-
gation of finality rule, even where there is a deferred adjudication), with id. at 232 (Grant,
J., concurring) (arguing that the enactment of the IIRIRA conviction definition "eradi-
cates" the underpinnings of Pino). It is of course the position of this Note that enactment
of the IIRIRA conviction does not affect the underpinnings of Pino. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
It bears repeating that the concurring Punu opinion is careful to note that the court does
not reach the question of finality rule survival in a case arising under the first part of the
definition. Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 234 n.1 (Grant, J., concurring). This suggests that the
concurrence would still construe a finality rule within the first part of the definition, de-
spite taking the view that finality is not a separate requirement in determining whether
there is a conviction. Id at 232.
240. The Garcia-Echaverria court states the finality rule, cites Pino, and applies the facts
to the rule, not even considering the possibility that the finality rule has been abolished in
a case such as the one before it. United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445 (6th
Cir. 2004).
241. The IIRIRA as a whole has been greatly criticized in this regard. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Selective Deporting of Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at A22
(noting "widespread confusion over how to interpret the densely worded, internally con-
tradictory" IIRIRA); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 498 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (noting that it is not surprising that IIRIRA contains an error); id. at
501 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that IIRIRA manages to simultaneously grant and
deny judicial review to certain aliens in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997).
242. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (9) (West 2004).
243. While this Note takes the view that the overwhelming weight of evidence shows
that the finality rule survives IIRIRA, this argument is included so as to show a basis for
finding finality rule survival even if arguments that the Galarn.a-Solis interpretation of Monte-
negro is permissible can be mustered despite the issues outlined herein.
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Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit's post-Montenegro application of the finality rule
in Garcia-Echaverria2"4 constitutes an emerging circuit split that creates
the possibility that similarly situated noncitizens will be treated com-
pletely differently under federal immigration law depending on which
circuit's jurisdiction they are located within. This difference in treat-
ment is arbitrary and serves no purpose, thereby raising equal protec-
tion problems.245 Other circuit courts of appeal that face the question
of whether to apply the finality rule to the IRIRA definition of "con-
viction" will have a choice in which interpretation to follow. Such
courts should follow the lead of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Garcia-
Echaverria because it deals with a standard state criminal conviction
that arises under the first part of the lIRIRA definition covering a for-
mal adjudication. 246
More importantly, courts should interpret IIRIRA in a manner
that is consistent with congressional intent and the rules of statutory
construction, avoiding an interpretation that raises serious constitu-
tional questions and upsets the standard of guilt set by states. An indi-
vidual contesting guilt by seeking appellate review as-of-right of a trial
conviction is different in kind from someone who pleads guilty and is
granted mitigation of the consequences of having a criminal record
due to public policy choices by state legislatures.2 47 Such a person
should not be banished before that appeal is even heard. The Seventh
Circuit, which has recently displayed a lack of stomach for the severe
interpretations of immigration regulations introduced by the DHS as
part of the post-September 11 war on terror, should clarify its ruling in
Montenegro at the earliest opportunity. 248
244. 374 F.3d at 445.
245. SeePlylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Garberding v. INS., 30 F.3d 1187, 1190
(9th Cir. 1994) ("When the INS distinguishes one class of aliens for different treatment
there must be some rational basis for doing so; otherwise, its classification is wholly
irrational").
246. See Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d at 445.
247. See supra note 26, note 109, and accompanying text.
248. Abdon M. Pallasch & Natasha Korecki, Judges Fight Speedy Deportations, Cm. SUN-
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at 13A.
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